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A commonly held tenet is that lasers well above threshold emit photons in a coherent state, which
follow a Poissonian statistics when measured in photon number. This feature is often exploited to
build quantum-based random number generators or to derive the secure key rate of quantum key
distribution systems. Hence the photon number distribution of the light source can directly impact
the randomness and the security distilled from such devices. Here, we propose a method based on
measuring correlation functions to experimentally characterise a light source’s photon statistics and
use it in the estimation of a quantum key distribution system’s key rate. This promises to be a
useful tool for the certification of quantum-related technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) [1–3]
and quantum key distribution (QKD) [4–6] are the first
quantum-related technology to leap out of the lab and
reach the maturity necessary for the market.
The goal of a QRNG is to generate unpredictable num-
bers based on the laws of quantum physics. The typi-
cal example is a single, indivisible, photon impinging on
a beam splitter [1, 7, 8], which ideally provides a uni-
formly distributed random bit, 0 or 1, depending on the
output port it emerges from. By measuring the pho-
tons with a pair of photodetectors, it is possible to ex-
tract random strings that can be suitably post-processed
and employed for cryptographic applications as well as
for lotteries, gambling and scientific simulations. Other
common implementations are based on events that are
expected to follow a Poissonian distribution, for example
the arrival time of photons emitted by a coherent light
source [2, 9–12]. In other cases, as for QRNGs based on
the phase noise of a laser [13–18], the Poissonian nature
of the source can evidence the good functioning of the
randomness-generating mechanism.
The aim of QKD, on the other hand, is to generate
shared randomness between two distant parties, tradi-
tionally called Alice and Bob, through the exchange of
quantum signals. The most common light source in QKD
systems is a laser followed by an attenuator. The atten-
uation level depends on the particular protocol imple-
mented, but in general it is set so that the intensity of
the emitted pulses approaches the single-photon regime,
which is captured by the following condition:
µ =
∑
n
pnn < 1. (1)
In Eq. (1), µ is the mean photon number of each emitted
pulse and pn is the probability to emit n photons. The
calibration of the mean photon number is essential to
guarantee the security of QKD systems. If µ is too large,
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FIG. 1. Schematic of photon number distributions in a train
of optical pulses with average photon number µ = 1. (a) Pois-
sonian source; (b) super-Poissonian source; (c) single-photon
source. Each coloured dot represents a single photon. Vertical
lines identify the optical pulses in the same time slot.
the secret information is redundantly encoded in n > 1
photons, allowing an eavesdropper (Eve) to access the
secret information. Therefore µ has to be carefully set
and it is typically monitored in real time in existing QKD
systems [19].
However, this is not the only security requirement and
the statistics of the source, represented by pn in Eq. (1),
also plays a crucial role. To gain some insight into this
problem, consider Fig. 1, where three different types of
photon number distributions are depicted, all displaying
an average photon number µ = 1. Fig. 1(a) is the Pois-
sonian case, with pn = e
−µµn/n!, which typically stems
from a laser operated well above threshold [20]. The
resulting distribution is composed of statistically inde-
pendent events and the number of photons in each pulse
varies in a random way. In the super-Poissonian case,
on the other hand, represented in Fig. 1(b), the light is
composed of photons bunched in the same optical pulse.
The typical example is a thermal source, which features
a photon number statistics equal to pn = µ
n/(1 +µ)1+n.
Finally, we show in Fig. 1(c) the ideal case of a true
single-photon source, which features p1 = 1, pn 6=1 = 0
and displays deterministic emission of exactly one pho-
ton per pulse.
Security-wise, the case (c) is the most secure, as there
never is more than one photon carrying the secret infor-
mation. On the contrary, the case (b) is the least secure,
because the photon bunching effect favours the redun-
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2dant encoding of the information. This shows that even
if the mean photon number µ is well characterised, the
photon number distribution probability pn can still de-
termine the insecurity of a QKD system. It is therefore
important to find ways to characterise the photon statis-
tics pn of a quantum-related light source.
For that, one method would be to use photon number
resolving detectors or, equivalently, space-multiplexed or
time-multiplexed threshold detectors [21]. However, in
this case, a precise calibration of the detection efficiency
would be required, which is far from trivial. A sec-
ond, more practical, method is the one proposed here.
We perform a generalised Hanbury Brown-Twiss (HBT)
experiment [22, 23] to estimate the normalised correla-
tion functions g(m)(τ) [24, 25] of the light source, with
m = {2, 3, 4}. These functions, evaluated at time de-
lay τ = 0, are closely related to the photon statistics of
the light source. For example, it is well-known that if
pn follows a Poissonian statistics, the light source has all
the g(m)(0) equal to unity [20], irrespective of the order
m. Although experimentally it is not possible to mea-
sure the correlation functions to all orders, we will show
that measuring them up to the fourth order is sufficient
to determine tight bounds on the secure key rate of a
QKD system. To apply this method, we will work in the
low detection efficiency approximation. This allows us to
treat our threshold detectors as linear and makes our esti-
mate independent of the exact efficiency of the detectors
used in the experiment. The details of this approach are
given in the next Sec. II. In Sec. III we will describe the
experimental implementation, whereas in Sec. IV we will
exploit our experimental results to estimate the secure
key rate of a QKD system [26].
II. NORMALISED CORRELATION
FUNCTIONS
In the present work, we are interested in the character-
isation of the photon statistics pn of a light source that is
suitable for quantum-related technologies like a QRNG
or a QKD system. We consider a scenario where the
characterisation is worked out using detectors that are
only loosely calibrated. In particular, we assume that
the tester has guarantees that the efficiency of his de-
tectors is positive but, at the same time, smaller than a
certain threshold η0. This allows us to treat threshold
detectors as if they were linear and makes our result in-
dependent of the exact value of the detectors’ efficiency.
This assumption is perfectly reasonable if the source is
tested in a trusted environment, where there is no eaves-
dropping ongoing during the test. It is then reasonable to
assume that the tester has a certain control over his de-
tectors and can arbitrarily decrease their efficiency below
η0 using a suitable attenuator.
Under this assumption, we can write the “normal-
ized correlation functions” [24, 25], or “degrees of coher-
ence” [20], g(2)(0), g(3)(0), g(4)(0) of a stationary light
source as:
g(2)(0) =
〈
aˆ†aˆ†aˆaˆ
〉
/
〈
aˆ†aˆ
〉2
(2)
g(3)(0) =
〈
aˆ†aˆ†aˆ†aˆaˆaˆ
〉
/
〈
aˆ†aˆ
〉3
(3)
g(4)(0) =
〈
aˆ†aˆ†aˆ†aˆ†aˆaˆaˆaˆ
〉
/
〈
aˆ†aˆ
〉4
(4)
where aˆ† and aˆ are the boson construction and destruc-
tion operators of a single quantum of light, respectively,
and the bra-ket notation indicates the average operation
over the states emitted by the source.
When the source is pulsed, which is often the case in
QKD systems, the above relations can be written in a
discrete form [27, 28]:
g(2)[0] =
〈
aˆ†kaˆ
†
kaˆkaˆk
〉
/
〈
aˆ†kaˆk
〉2
(5)
g(3)[0] =
〈
aˆ†kaˆ
†
kaˆ
†
kaˆkaˆkaˆk
〉
/
〈
aˆ†kaˆk
〉3
(6)
g(4)[0] =
〈
aˆ†kaˆ
†
kaˆ
†
kaˆ
†
kaˆkaˆkaˆkaˆk
〉
/
〈
aˆ†kaˆk
〉4
(7)
where k denotes the integer value representing the pulse
number. In the following, we will use a compressed no-
tation gm to indicate the quantity g
(m)[0], dropping the
zero time delay whenever it is unnecessary to specify it.
The normalized photon correlation functions in
Eqs. (5)-(7) represent the quantities measured in our ex-
periment. Under the low detection efficiency approxi-
mation they are attractive from an experimental point of
view as they can be measured using threshold single pho-
ton detectors. In Sec. III we will describe the experiment
performed to estimate these functions.
To connect the discrete correlation functions gm with
the photon statistics pn, we consider the density matrix
of the state emitted by the source, expressed as a sum of
photon number states:
ρ =
∑∞
n=0
pn |n〉 〈n| . (8)
Upon rewriting Eqs. (5)-(7) in terms of the density ma-
trix in Eq. (8), and using the compressed notation previ-
ously introduced, we obtain:
g2 =
∑∞
n=0
pn[n (n− 1)]/µ2 (9)
g3 =
∑∞
n=0
pn[n (n− 1) (n− 2)]/µ3 (10)
g4 =
∑∞
n=0
pn[n (n− 1) (n− 2) (n− 3)]/µ4 (11)
where µ has been defined in Eq. (1). From the above
equations, it is apparent that the value of µ is necessary
to find out the n-photon probability pn. For example, it
is intuitive that for large µ the pn will be centred around
larger values of n. However, the exact determination of µ
is not necessary for estimating the correlation functions
gm. Therefore we can treat µ as a parameter of the the-
ory, known to the user Alice who prepares the states for
the QKD protocol. It is worth noting that µ is usually
determined quite easily and precisely in existing QKD
systems by means of a calibrated power meter.
3FIG. 2. Schematic of the experimental arrangement for mea-
suring normalized correlation functions up to the fourth or-
der. ECA: electronically controlled attenuator, SD-APD: self-
differencing avalanche photodiode.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
A schematic of the experimental arrangement used to
characterise the gm functions is shown in Fig. 2. In order
to connect our method with a prominent application, the
light source to be characterised has been taken directly
from a GHz-clocked QKD prototype [19].
It consists of a DFB laser diode linked to a 1 GHz pulse
generator and driven by a DC current source. A small
DC current is supplied to the laser diode from the DC
current source, which causes a minor amount of sponta-
neous emission. The pulse generator produces a square
wave with approximately 2V amplitude which modulates
the DFB laser diode on top of the DC current. Un-
der normal operating conditions, the modulation drives
the laser diode in a gain switched mode, i.e., above and
below lasing threshold. This causes a train of phase-
randomised optical pulses to be produced at a frequency
of 1GHz [18]. The resulting optical pulses are then at-
tenuated to the single photon level using an electroni-
cally controlled attenuator (ECA), so that the condition
expressed by Eq. (1) is satisfied in our experiments.
To analyse the correlation functions, a four channel
HBT interferometer was constructed. Photons from the
QKD laser source under test are transmitted into a
50:50 beamsplitter whereupon they encounter a second
50:50 beamsplitter. Four self-differencing avalanche pho-
todiodes (SD-APD) [29] synchronised to the QKD laser
source detect the transmitted photons. Care was taken
in the experiment to guarantee a detection efficiency well
below 1% in each detector. The subsequent electrical
output from each SD-APD is then discriminated before
being sent to a correlator card where time stamps are
assigned to the photon arrivals. The time stamps from
the correlator were analysed by a custom built program.
The program constructed two, three and four-fold pho-
ton coincidences from the photon arrival times. From
this data, the resulting correlation functions up to the
fourth order were evaluated.
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FIG. 3. (a): Laser DC current vs optical output power from
DFB laser diode. Above threshold, around 4.5 mA, there is a
steep rise in output power. (b): g2 − 1 as a function of laser
optical intensity I, normalised to threshold optical intensity
I0 with I0 = 12.67µW. Points: Experimental data. Solid
curve: fit of the non-linear oscillator model using I0 as a free
parameter. Dashed curve: non-linear oscillator model with
I0 = 5.38µW.
A. Dependence on laser drive current
We start our analysis by examining the effect of chang-
ing the laser drive current on the normalised second order
correlation function g2. This allows us to gain some in-
sight on how the photon statistics might change for a
laser diode under different operating conditions.
Fig. 3(a) shows the DC laser current vs optical out-
put power dependence for the QKD laser source. The
1GHz square wave modulation is applied at all times.
Note the optical power is measured before the ECA us-
ing a standard optical power meter. As expected, the
optical output rises sharply after the lasing threshold,
around 4.5 mA, has been exceeded. Fig. 3(b) (points)
shows the resulting normalised second order correlation
function minus one (g2 − 1) as measured in the single
photon regime (i.e. after the ECA). Below lasing thresh-
old, g2 − 1 ≈ 1, indicating photon bunching, as might
be expected for a thermal-like source. Around threshold,
g2 − 1 starts to reduce. As the DC current is further
increased, the fluctuations begin to die out and g2 − 1
tends to 0, indicating the laser emission is approaching
Poissonian-like photon statistics, for which g2 = 1.
To gain more insight into the functional dependence of
g2 − 1 on laser intensity, we fit the experimental data in
Fig. 3(b) with a non-linear oscillator model [? ], using
a single free parameter, the laser threshold intensity I0.
This model has been successful in describing g2 around
lasing threshold for gas lasers [? ] provided the lasers
under study can be approximated as single mode. The
fit gives I0 = 12.67 µW corresponding to a DC current
of 4.49 mA (solid curve in Fig. 3(b)). The fit appears
reasonable for the experimental points around I = I0
and up to I = 6. Beyond this laser intensity, the model
overestimates g2 − 1. Alternatively, we can extract a
rough indication of lasing threshold I0 from Fig. 3(a)
whereby we fit the experimental data above I0 using a
straight line, yielding I0 = 5.38 µW, corresponding to a
DC current of 4.34 mA. This gives the dashed curve in
44mA
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FIG. 4. (a): Measured normalised correlation functions g2,
g3 and g4 for a DC current of 4.0 mA. (b): m-th order gm−1
as a function of the order m. Red bars: experimental data;
blue bars: prediction of non-linear oscillator model when I0 =
5.38 µW; wine bars: prediction of non-linear oscillator model
when I0 = 12.67 µW.
Fig. 3(b), now obtained with no free fitting parameters.
In this case the experimental points in the range I > I0
and I < I0 ≈ 10 are above the dashed curve although
the points > I0 ≈ 10 are closer to the prediction of this
model.
The above analysis suggests the underlying model of
the non-linear oscillator qualitatively describes the exper-
imental data, if not quantitatively. Most likely the ideal
model lies between the two curves in Fig. 3(b). This in-
dicates the excess g2−1 for the experimental points with
the three highest intensities is due to additional fluctua-
tions on top of the noise predicted by the model. Note,
as we show below, we do not rely on any physical model
to construct bounds on the secure bit rate, see Sec. IV.
For use in QKD, it is important to choose an appro-
priate DC current level. Too low gives large photon
bunching and therefore a high incidence of multi-photon
events, which greatly facilitates photon number splitting
attacks by an eavesdropper. Too high a DC current yields
Poissonian behaviour but increases the laser CW optical
background. A high CW optical background increases
the phase correlation between successive optical pulses
and destroys the phase randomisation of the QKD laser
source [18].
We choose a compromise such that under normal op-
erating conditions, i.e. during QKD, the DC current is
set to approximately 6.5 mA which corresponds to g2−1
of the order of 10−3, as shown in Fig. 3(b).
Next we characterise higher order correlations. By way
of comparison higher order correlations are measured for
two cases. Firstly, below lasing threshold at a DC cur-
rent of about 4.0 mA. Secondly, above lasing threshold,
where the DC current is 6.5 mA corresponding to normal
operating conditions.
1. Variation of gm for laser below threshold
We first examine the variation of the higher order
correlation functions when the laser is operated below
threshold. A DC current of 4.0 mA is selected.
Fig. 4(a) shows the measured normalised correlation
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FIG. 5. (a): Measured normalised correlation functions g2,
g3 and g4 for a DC current of 6.5 mA. (b): n-th order nor-
malised correlation functions as a function of the order n. Red
bars: experimental data; blue bars: prediction of non-linear
oscillator model when I0 = 5.38 µW; wine bars: prediction of
non-linear oscillator model when I0 = 12.67 µW.
functions g2, g3 and g4 and the numerical values are listed
in the following equations:
g2 = 1.6985± 0.0138, (12)
g3 = 4.21± 0.13, (13)
g4 = 17.11± 2.84. (14)
The source displays a high level of bunching, approaching
a thermal distribution, hence we term it “quasi-thermal”.
The peak at time zero grows with the order m, as shown
with red bars in Fig. 4(b). Also plotted are the predic-
tions of the non-linear oscillator model for the two laser
threshold intensities shown in Fig. 3(b). Both scenarios
predict slightly stronger correlations for all orders com-
pared to what was experimentally measured. This be-
haviour can be intuitively understood by assuming the
source is mainly bunched but also possesses a smaller
Poissonian component since the measured g2 = 1.6985 is
less than the value g2 = 2 expected for a purely ther-
mal source. The bunching contribution naturally gives
stronger correlation values gm as m is increased but at
the same time the smaller Poissonian component con-
tributes to reducing these correlation values.
2. Variation of gm for laser above threshold
We now turn our attention to the variation of the
higher order correlation functions when the laser is op-
erated above threshold. A DC current of 6.5 mA is se-
lected for this purpose. Fig. 5(a) shows the measured
normalised correlation functions g2, g3 and g4 and the
numerical values are:
g2 = 1.0041± 0.0039, (15)
g3 = 1.0059± 0.0056, (16)
g4 = 1.099± 0.049. (17)
This time there is no clear peak at time zero, which in-
dicates the laser is qualitatively Poissonian. However,
plotting the gm as a function of m reveals an ever so
slight increase in correlation despite the large error bars,
5Fig. 5(b), red bars. On this occasion the source appears
to have a minor bunched-like component, hence much
weaker correlation values gm are observed as the order m
is increased, compared to the previous case.
Again we plot the predictions of the non-linear oscil-
lator model for the two laser threshold intensities shown
in Fig. 3(b). For g2 and g3 the measured data is between
the two predictions. For g4 both predictions slightly un-
derestimate g4. The reason for this is unclear but the
error bar for the g4 measured point is almost an order
of magnitude greater than the error bars for g2 and g3.
This stems from the four-fold coincidence count rate be-
ing considerably lower than three or two-fold coincidence
count rates. Furthermore, g4 − 1 is quite small, < 0.1.
This can be compared with g4 − 1 in Fig. 4(a), which is
around a factor of hundred larger.
Note for the measured correlation functions we have
also considered corrections from afterpulsing, dark counts
and dead time. However these corrections are well within
the size of one error bar, so have consequently been safely
neglected in the current analysis.
IV. WORST-CASE BOUNDS FROM
CORRELATION FUNCTIONS AND SECURE
KEY RATE
Let us now consider how the experimental results from
the previous section can be used to determine the secure
key rate of a QKD system. For that, we rewrite the key
rate equation for the efficient [30, 31] decoy-state [32–34]
BB84 protocol [4] in the finite-size scenario [26, 35, 36]
in the following way:
R ≥ pup2Z{p1y1,Z [1− h(e1,X)]− fQZh(EZ)−∆}. (18)
With minor modifications, Eq. (18) can be easily adapted
to other BB84-like protocols. To write it, we considered
a protocol where Alice prepares phase-randomised weak
coherent states in the two bases Z and X, randomly cho-
sen with probabilities pZ and pX = 1− pZ , respectively,
and in the three intensity classes u (signal), v (decoy) and
w (vacuum), randomly chosen with probabilities pw, pv
and pu = 1−pv−pw, respectively. However, the users ex-
tract the secure key bits only from the basis Z and from
the class u. The quantity R is the fraction of secure bits
per signal distilled by the system; when multiplied by the
system’s clock rate, it provides the amount of secure bits
in the time unit; e1,X is the upper bound to the single-
photon QBER in the X basis and y
1,Z
is the lower bound
to the 1-photon yield in the Z basis. This last quantity
is multiplied by the lower bound to the 1-photon prob-
ability, p
1
, thus providing an overall lower bound to the
1-photon gain of the protocol. Finally, f is the ineffi-
ciency of error correction, QZ and EZ are the gain and
the QBER, respectively, measured in the Z basis and ∆
is a parameter related to the finite-size effect.
The crucial difference between the rate in Eq. (18) and
previous QKD key rates resides in the term p
1
. Usually, a
FIG. 6. Bounds to the photon probabilities p0, p1, p2 for var-
ious experimental conditions. In the top right corner of each
diagram, the correlation functions used in the estimation of
the bounds and the mean photon number µ are indicated. Un-
derlined (overlined) quantities are for lower (upper) bounds
obtained from the experimental data given in Sec. III A 2,
Eqs. (15)-(17), for a confidence interval of 7 standard devia-
tions. The superscript P refers to the ideal Poissonian distri-
bution. Numerical Values. Poissonian: pPn = e
−µµn/n!, with
µ = {0.42, 0.1}. Bounds – clockwise starting from top-left di-
agram: p0 = {0.580; 0.655; 0.905; 0.655; } p0 = {0.670; 0.669;
0.905; 0.659; } p1 = {0.2411; 0.2411; 0.0903; 0.2702; } p1 =
{0.4203; 0.2826; 0.0906; 0.2826; } p2 = {0; 0.04973; 0.00446;
0.04973; } p2 = {0.08947; 0.08947; 0.00461; 0.06405.}
Poissonian distribution is assumed for decoy-state QKD,
entailing that p1 = µe
−µ [32–34]. However, by applying
our method, we can now drop this assumption and re-
place it with the lower bound p
1
that is measured in the
experimental characterisation of the light source. Simi-
lar bounds can be obtained for the other probabilities p0,
p≥2, as well as for the other parameters y0, y1, e1 usu-
ally present in decoy-state QKD. The details on the con-
strained numerical optimization providing such bounds
are given in the Appendix.
As an example, in Fig. 6 we provide the bounds for
p0, p1 and p2 drawn from the experimental values re-
ported in Eqs. (15)-(17) and we compare them with the
corresponding probabilities from the Poissonian distribu-
tions, for various experimental conditions. On the top-
left diagram, we consider the case where Alice prepares a
mean photon number µ = 0.42, a common value for the
signal state in decoy-state QKD, and uses only the g2
function from Eq. (15) as a constraint. In this case, the
comparison with the ideal Poissonian probabilities nor-
mally used in decoy-state QKD shows that the bounds
are quite loose. Therefore, we expect a dramatic reduc-
tion of the key rate obtained by assuming that the dis-
tribution is Poissonian. However, if more constraints are
added, the bounds become tighter and tighter, as can
be noted from the top-right and bottom-left diagrams
in Fig. 6. This should entail a close-to-ideal key rate in
these cases. Finally, when the mean photon number is
6FIG. 7. Secure key rate of the efficient decoy-state BB84 pro-
tocol in the finite-size scenario, for the ideal case of a Poisso-
nian source (black line) and for the real case where the corre-
lation functions up to the fourth order have been measured.
The values of the correlation functions have all been drawn
from the experiments. The blue, green and wine lines corre-
spond to the source described in Sec. III A 2, Eqs. (15)-(17),
whereas the red line is for the source in Sec. III A 1, Eqs. (12)–
(14). The bounds for this latter source, which displays a
quasi-thermal distribution, are given in the inset, together
with the Poisson probabilities for comparative purposes. The
mean photon number for the signal and the decoy states in the
protocol have been set to u = 0.42 and v = 0.02, respectively,
and the security parameter is  < 10−10.
decreased to µ = 0.1, a value commonly used for decoy
states in QKD, and all the constraints are applied, the
match with the Poissonian probabilities is nearly perfect
(see bottom-right diagram in Fig. 6), implying a negligi-
ble reduction in the key rate.
In the estimation leading to Fig. 6, we have considered
that the experimental errors follow a Gaussian distribu-
tion and we have taken γ = 7 standard deviations to de-
fine the related confidence interval. This corresponds to
a probability  = 2.56×10−12 that the true experimental
value falls outside the confidence interval. In turn, once
all the confidence intervals related to the constrained op-
timisation are taken into account [37], this probability
generates a global security parameter for the QKD pro-
tocol in the finite-size scenario [38, 39] well below 10−10.
As a prominent application of our method, we use the
bounds just derived to estimate the secure key rate of
a QKD system according to Eq. (18). The results are
shown in Fig. 7. It can be seen that when the g2 func-
tion is the only constraint in the problem (wine-coloured
line), there is a considerable decrease in key rate and
maximum distance achieved by protocol. On the con-
trary, when also the g3 and g4 are taken into account
(green and blue lines), the key rate is very close to the
ideal one. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact
that each additional constraint improves the bounds on
the pn. When only g2 is considered, we can only reliably
bound the first term in the photon statistics, p0, which
does not enter the key rate equation (18), or it plays only
a minor role in other versions of the BB84 protocol [36].
However, when both g2 and g3 are considered, we can
bound p0 and p1, the latter being the most important
term in the secure key rate. This explains the large gap
in the plotted key rates between the orange line (g2 only)
and the red line (g2 and g3 together).
In the same figure, we also plot in red colour the
key rate corresponding to the quasi-thermal source de-
scribed in Sec. III A 1, which is obtained by plugging
Eqs. (12)–(14) into the corresponding optimisation prob-
lem. The upper and lower bounds are shown in the inset
of Fig. 7. It can be noticed that the lower bound for the
zero-photon fraction of this distribution (leftmost yellow
bar) is higher than the corresponding Poisson probabil-
ity (brown bar), clearly showing that the distribution is
not Poissonian. Nevertheless, it is still possible to ex-
tract from it a key rate that remains positive up to a dis-
tance of about 40 km in optical fibre. Larger distances
might be achieved upon optimisation of the system’s pa-
rameters. This positive key rate is remarkable given the
highly bunched nature of the source and represents an
experimental evidence of a positive key rate drawn from
a quasi-thermal source.
On the other hand, this result should be treated as a
caveat for the correct operation of a laser source. If the
laser is unawarely operated close-to-threshold, the users
will not realise that the correct key rate is the one cor-
responding to a quasi-thermal source (red line in Fig. 7)
and will keep using the privacy amplification correspond-
ing to a Poissonian source. This entails that less privacy
amplification than necessary will be performed, compro-
mising the security of the system. The calibration of
the QKD system’s light source and the detailed descrip-
tion of its operative parameters represent a desirable best
practice to prevent these kind of security risks.
V. CONCLUSION
In quantum-related technology, claims about random-
ness and security crucially depend on a set of assumptions
that have to be carefully met in the implementation. In
the present work, we introduced and experimentally re-
alised a test for one of the most common assumptions
in QRNG devices and QKD systems, i.e., the Poissonian
nature of the light source.
The method is based on a generalised HBT exper-
iment [22] with single-photon detectors in the low-
efficiency approximation. If the detection efficiency is
known to be small, the exact efficiency of each detector
simplifies in the corresponding expressions of the nor-
malised correlation functions, Eqs. (5)-(7). This lets us
bypass an accurate calibration of the detectors, which is
often a cumbersome process.
On the other hand, our method makes it possible to
7test a light source upon which the tester has some limited
prior knowledge. For example, we showed that the source
in this work qualitatively follows a well-established laser
model. However, the technique does not make use of this
model and makes no stringent assumptions on the physics
underlying the photon source under test. This identifies
a practical way to undertake calibration tests, which are
normally performed in the protected environment of a
laboratory, where the assumptions on the potential pres-
ence of a malevolent agent are mild.
The results of the experimental tests, given in
Eqs. (12)-(14) for a laser operated close to threshold and
in Eqs. (15)-(17) for a laser above threshold, show that
photon statistics of the light source crucially depend on
the driving current. When the laser is operated above
threshold, the photon distribution is very close to Pois-
sonian, which is especially true when the mean photon
number is low. In this case, the normalised correlation
functions up to the fourth order are all close to 1. This
implies that the bounds to the Poissonian distribution,
depicted in Fig. 6, are quite tight. Nevertheless, when
plugged in a typical key rate equation for a QKD sys-
tem, these bounds generate a key rate that can deviate
from the ideal one. This is shown in Fig. 7, which sug-
gests that measuring at least the g2 and g3 correlation
functions is essential to avoid a major reduction of the
secure key rate. This is feasible and practical, as we have
shown, thus promoting the present method as a useful
tool to guarantee the security of QKD systems. Close
to threshold, the distribution of the emitted photons be-
comes quasi-thermal and displays a highly bunched be-
haviour. However, even without optimising the system’s
parameters, we could obtain a positive key rate over a
few tens of kilometres of optical fibre.
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Appendix A: Bounds for the photon statistics
In this section we show how to bound the photon probabilities pn using the experimentally measured correlation
functions gm, with m = {2, 3, 4}. This is a constrained optimisation problem that can be cast in linear form, so that
it is efficient and provides a global solution. In this problem, the probabilities pn are the objective functions and the
experimental correlation functions are the constraints.
We will consider in the following a specific problem, i.e., the minimisation of the single-photon probability p1 when
Alice emits optical pulses with average photon number µ. Other problems related to the maximisation of p1, or to
the optimisation of the other pn’s, with n 6= 1, are analogous and can be straightforwardly obtained from the one
described here.
Asymptotic case
We initially analyse the problem in the so-called asymptotic scenario, where it is assumed that an infinitely large
data sample is available to the users. In the next sections we will generalise this case to the finite-size setting. The
optimisation problem we consider can be expressed as:
8min: pˆ1
subject to: 1 =
∑∞
n=0 pˆn
gˆ2 =
∑∞
n=0 pˆnn (n− 1) /µ2
gˆ3 =
∑∞
n=0 pˆnn (n− 1) (n− 2) /µ3
gˆ4 =
∑∞
n=0 pˆnn (n− 1) (n− 2) (n− 3) /µ4
0 ≤ pˆn ≤ 1
g2 ≤ gˆ2 ≤ g2
g3 ≤ gˆ3 ≤ g3
g4 ≤ gˆ4 ≤ g4
(A1)
where we have used hatted letters to indicate the variables of the problem and underlined or over-lined letters to
indicate lower or upper bounds to the corresponding physical quantities, respectively. These bounds are specified as
follows:
g2 = g2 − γ × σg2 ; g2 = g2 + γ × σg2 (A2)
g3 = g3 − γ × σg3 ; g3 = g3 + γ × σg3 (A3)
g4 = g4 − γ × σg4 ; g4 = g4 + γ × σg4 (A4)
where the σ quantities account for the experimental errors and γ specifies the number of standard deviations defining
the confidence interval related to the experiment, assuming a Gaussian distribution of the associated random variable.
The problem in Eq. (A1) is linear in the unknowns and can be readily solved to find the global minimum for pˆ1.
Finite-size case
The problem in Eq. (A1) contains sums that run on an infinite number of terms. This is impractical to treat, so we
turn it into a problem that contains a finite number of terms. The idea behind this is that when Eq. (1) is fulfilled,
only the first few terms in the sums give a relevant contribution. To write the finite-size optimisation problem, we
will limit the number of photons n to the interval [0, Ncut], with Ncut a natural number chosen large enough to satisfy
the following condition:
Ncut∑
n=0
pn ≥
∞∑
n=Ncut
pn. (A5)
By choosing Ncut large enough, the condition in Eq. (A5) can always be fulfilled. On the practical side, we choose
Ncut = 25 in our solution of the optimisation problem. This entails that we are discarding all the photon distributions
where the probability of having more than 25 photons in a single pulse is larger than the probability of having less
than 25 photons in a single pulse. We believe that this assumption is met in all the distributions of practical interest.
For example, if we consider a source where the measured average photon number µ is smaller than one, as in Eq. (1),
our solution rules out a distribution where one optical pulse contains 25 photons and the following 24 pulses are empty,
whereas it includes the three distributions depicted in Fig. 1. Moreover, also the most exotic photon distributions
could be covered by further increasing the value of Ncut, which is feasible, due to the linearity of the problem.
By using the closure condition
∑∞
n=0 pn = 1 we can rewrite the assumption in Eq. (A5) as
∑Ncut
n=0 pn ≥ 1/2. This,
in turn, provides the following bounds for the sum of the variables pˆn’s in the finite-size scenario:
1 ≥
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆn ≥ 1
2
. (A6)
The lower bound in the above equation can be used to rewrite the lower bounds for the other constraints of the
9optimisation problem: ∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn ≥ µ/2, (A7)∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn
2 ≥ (µ2gˆ2 + µ)/2, (A8)∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn
3 ≥ (µ3gˆ3 + 3µ2gˆ2 + µ)/2, (A9)∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn
4 ≥ (µ4gˆ4 + 6µ3gˆ3 + 7µ2gˆ2 + µ)/2. (A10)
To upper bound the finite sum related to the average photon number, we exploit the following chain of relations:
µ =
∑∞
n=0
pˆnn (A11)
=
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn+
∑∞
n=Ncut+1
pˆnn (A12)
≥
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn+ (Ncut + 1)
∑∞
n=Ncut+1
pˆn. (A13)
Similar relations can be easily found for the correlation functions. The resulting upper bounds for the constraints,
paired with those in Eqs. (A7)-(A10), are:
µ− (Ncut + 1)
(
1−
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆn
)
≥
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn (A14)
µ2gˆ2 + µ− (Ncut + 1)
(
µ−
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn
)
≥
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn
2 (A15)
µ3gˆ3 + 3µ
2gˆ2 + µ− (Ncut + 1)
(
µ2gˆ2 + µ−
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn
2
)
≥
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn
3 (A16)
µ4gˆ4 + 6µ
3gˆ3 + 7µ
2gˆ2 + µ− (Ncut + 1)
(
µ3gˆ3 + 3µ
2gˆ2 + µ−
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn
3
)
≥
∑Ncut
n=0
pˆnn
4 (A17)
Appendix B: Optimisation of the photon number yields
In this section, we bound the photon number yields yn estimated through the decoy-state technique. As in the
previous section, we only consider a specific problem, i.e., the minimisation of the single-photon yield y1, which is the
most relevant contribution to the key rate in Eq. (18). Other problems related to the maximisation of y1 or to the
optimisation of the other yn’s, with n 6= 1, can be treated in a similar manner.
The objective function in the constrained-minimisation problem is y1 and the constraints are given by the usual
decoy-state equations:
Y (u) =
∑∞
n=0
pˆ(u)n yˆn (B1)
Y (v) =
∑∞
n=0n
pˆ(v)n yˆn (B2)
Y (w) =
∑∞
n=0
pˆ(w)n yˆn (B3)
0 ≤ yˆn ≤ 1 (B4)
p(µ)
n
≤ pˆ(µ)n ≤ p(µ)n (B5)
which should hold for all n and all µ ∈ {u, v, w}. In the above equations, the hatted quantities are the unknowns.
Moreover, we have indicated with p(µ)
n
and p
(µ)
n the lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the probability that
an n-photon pulse is emitted by the light source when the mean photon number µ is prepared. These bounds are
calculated from problems analogous to the one in Eq. (A1) for the probabilities p
(u)
0 , p
(u)
1 , p
(u)
2 and p
(u)
3 . The lower
(upper) bounds for the remaining probabilities for the signal state with intensity u = 0.42 are conservatively assumed
to be equal to 0 (to 1). The probabilities for the decoy state with intensity v = 0.02 and for the vacuum state with
intensity w = 10−4 are taken equal to the corresponding Poissonian distribution. This is justified by the fact that when
the mean photon number is so small, we did not observe any practical deviation from a Poissonian distribution (see
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bottom-right diagram in Fig. 6, where the mean photon number is 0.1, i.e., 5 times bigger than the value considered
here).
The constraints in Eqs. (B1)-(B3) define an optimisation problem that is nonlinear in the unknowns. This obstacle
can be overcome by replacing the unknowns pˆ
(µ)
n with their bounds p(µ)n and p
(µ)
n , drawn from the optimisation
problem in Eq. (A1) [41]. Moreover, the sums contain an infinite number of terms, which is not suitable for a
practical scenario. This can be easily circumvented using the same technique demonstrated for the problem in Sec. A
and in the literature [42], i.e., by cutting the sums to a finite value Ncut and then bounding the residual. As a result,
we obtain the following constraints:
Γµ = 1−
∑Ncut
n=0
p(µ)
n
(B6)
Y
(µ) ≥
∑Ncut
n=0
p(µ)
n
yˆn (B7)
Y (µ) ≤
∑Ncut
n=0
p(µ)n yˆn + Γµ (B8)
0 ≤ yˆn ≤ 1. (B9)
where we have indicated the upper and lower bounds to the experimental yields for the mean photon number µ as
Y
(µ)
and Y (µ), respectively, and the upper bound for the residual sum as Γµ.
Appendix C: Optimisation of the photon number error rates
The optimisation problem for the single-photon error rate e1 follows similar lines as in the previous sections. In
QKD, and in the key rate equation (18), it is important to find an upper bound to the error rate. This can be achieved
by replacing the bounds Y (µ) and Y
(µ)
in the previous section with the bounds for the bit error rate B(µ) = Y (µ)E(µ)
and B
(µ)
= Y
(µ)
E
(µ)
, respectively, and yˆn with bˆn. Then, after maximising bˆ1, e1 will be given by:
e1 =
b1
y
1
, (C1)
where y1 has been obtained from the yield optimisation problem. After straightforward steps, we obtain an explicit
upper bound for the single-photon error rate [37] which is the one used to draw the plots in Fig. 7:
e1 =
B
(u) − p
0
y
0
e0
p
1
y
1
. (C2)
[1] J. G. Rarity, P. Owens, and P. R. Tapster, J. Mod. Opt.
41, 2435 (1994).
[2] Y. Yoshizawa, H. Kimura, H. Inoue, K. Fujita,
M. Toyama, and O. Miyatake, J. Japanese Soc. Com-
put. Statist. 12, 67 (1999).
[3] X. Ma, X. Yuan, Z. Cao, B. Qi, and Z. Zhang, npj Quant.
Inf. 2, 16021 (2016).
[4] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Proc. of the IEEE Int.
Conf. on Comput. Sys. and Sign. Process. (IEEE, New
York, 1984), p. 175. (1984).
[5] Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[6] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[7] T. Jennewein, U. Achleitner, G. Weihs, H. Weinfurter,
and a. Zeilinger, Rev. Sci. Instrum. 71, 1675 (2000).
[8] A. Stefanov, N. Gisin, O. Guinnard, L. Guinnard, and
H. Zbinden, J. Mod. Opt. 47, 595 (2000).
[9] M. Stipcˇevic´ and B. M. Rogina, Rev. Sci. Instrum. 78,
045104 (2007).
[10] J. F. Dynes, Z. L. Yuan, A. W. Sharpe, and A. J. Shields,
Appl. Phys. Lett. 93, 031109 (2008).
[11] M. Fu¨rst, H. Weier, S. Nauerth, D. Marangon, C. Kurt-
siefer, and H. Weinfurter, Opt. Express 18, 13029 (2010).
[12] Y.-Q. Nie, H.-F. Zhang, Z. Zhang, J. Wang, X. Ma,
J. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan, Appl. Phys. Lett. 104, 051110
(2014).
[13] H. Guo, W. Tang, Y. Liu, and W. Wei, Phys. Rev. E
Stat. Nonlin. Soft. Matter. Phys. 81, 051137 (2010).
[14] B. Qi, Y.-M. Chi, H.-K. Lo, and L. Qian, Opt. Lett. 35,
312 (2010).
[15] M. Jofre, M. Curty, F. Steinlechner, G. Anzolin, J. P.
Torres, M. W. Mitchell, and V. Pruneri, Opt. Express
11
19, 20665 (2011).
[16] F. Xu, B. Qi, X. Ma, H. Xu, H. Zheng, and H.-K. Lo,
Opt. Express 20, 12366 (2012).
[17] C. Abella´n, W. Amaya, M. Jofre, M. Curty, A. Ac´ın,
J. Capmany, V. Pruneri, and M. W. Mitchell, Opt. Ex-
press 22, 1645 (2014).
[18] Z. L. Yuan, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, B. Fro¨hlich,
A. Plews, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys. Lett. 104,
261112 (2014).
[19] A. R. Dixon, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, B. Fro¨hlich,
A. W. Sharpe, A. Plews, S. Tam, Z. L. Yuan,
Y. Tanizawa, H. Sato, S. Kawamura, M. Fujiwara,
M. Sasaki, and A. J. Shields, Opt. Express 23, 7583
(2015).
[20] R. Loudon, The quantum theory of light, 3rd ed. (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2000).
[21] R. H. Hadfield, Nat. Photon. 3, 696 (2009).
[22] R. Hanbury Brown and R. Q. Twiss, Nature 178, 1046
(1956).
[23] R. Hanbury Brown and R. Q. Twiss, Proc. of the IEEE
Int. Conf. on Comput. Sys. and Sign. Process. (IEEE,
New York, 1984), p. 175. 242, 300 (1957).
[24] R. J. Glauber, Phys. Rev. 130, 2529 (1963).
[25] R. J. Glauber, Phys. Rev. 131, 2766 (1963).
[26] M. Lucamarini, K. A. Patel, J. F. Dynes, B. Fro¨hlich,
A. W. Sharpe, A. R. Dixon, Z. L. Yuan, R. V. Penty,
and A. J. Shields, Opt. Express 21, 24550 (2013).
[27] C. Santori, D. Fattal, J. Vucˇkovic´, G. S. Solomon,
E. Waks, and Y. Yamamoto, Phys. Rev. B 69, 1110
(2004).
[28] M. J. Stevens, S. Glancy, S. W. Nam, and R. P. Mirin,
Opt. Express 22, 3244 (2014).
[29] Z. L. Yuan, B. E. Kardynal, A. W. Sharpe, and A. J.
Shields, Appl. Phys. Lett. 91, 041114 (2007).
[30] H.-K. Lo, H. F. Chau, and M. Ardehali, J. Cryptology
18, 133 (2005).
[31] V. Scarani and R. Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 200501
(2008).
[32] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[33] X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[34] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94,
230504 (2005).
[35] M. Hayashi and R. Nakayama, New J. Phys. 16, 063009
(2014).
[36] C. C. W. Lim, M. Curty, N. Walenta, F. Xu, and
H. Zbinden, Phys. Rev. A 89, 374 (2014).
[37] M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J.
Shields (SPIE, 2012) p. 85421K.
[38] X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 72,
1217 (2005).
[39] Z. Zhang, Q. Zhao, M. Razavi, and X. Ma, Phys. Rev.
A 95, 325 (2017).
[40] M. Kumazawa, T. Sasaki, and M. Koashi, eprint
arXiv:1710.00457 (2017).
[41] M. Curty, F. Xu, W. Cui, C. C. W. Lim, K. Tamaki, and
H.-K. Lo, Nat. Commun. 5, 3732 (2014).
[42] K. Tamaki, M. Curty, and M. Lucamarini, New J. Phys.
18, 065008 (2016) .
